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TABLE I
PUBLIC DEBT. GROwTH. AND CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS IN EUROPE.
JAPAN, AND NORTH AMERiCA
1979 1989
Public Growth Current Public Growth Current
debe rate account debt rate account
(9'o GDPI (olc) (~Io GDPI I~k GDPI (`k) (`7o GDP)
Vorth Amcrica 18.2 3.0 -0.2 30.5 2.7 -3.1
Europc - 29.0 3.3 0.2 39.3 2.2 0.1
Japan 14.9 5.3 -0.9 I~.I 4.2 '--0
Group of Seven 20.5 3.5 -0.2 30.0 2.8 -0.5
.Vore. Thc growth rate is the average over the previous decade. while the public debt and
current account to GDP racios refer to the rcspective years. ~orth America consists of the
C;nitcd Scates and Canada and Europe of Germany, France. ltaly, and the Uniced Kingdom.
The Group of Stvcn consists ot the countries composing ~iorth America and Europe. plus
lapan. Thc weights uscd to consttvct the averages are l;nited States. 0.5?: Japan. 0.17:
Gcrmany. 0.08: France. 0.07: Ltaly. 0.05: United Kingdom. 0.06: and Canada. 0.06. These
are their shares in their combincd 1987 GDP, at 1985 prices and exchange rates. The source
for the origina! data was che database of the June 1990 OECD "Economic Oudoolc."
of current àccount imbalances, and significant rises in public debt to
GDP
ratios in the industrial economies. These latter rises were concentrated in
~Iorth America and some European economies. The average net public
debt to GDP ratio in the Group of Seven largest economies (G-7) rose by
almost !0 percentage points, from about 2001"o in 1979 to 30Io in 1989. The
average growth rate fell from 3.Sol"o per annum in the 1970s to 2.801o per
annum in the 1980s. At the same time, the dispersion of fiscal and current
account deficits increased. While the public debt to GDP ratio increased
by about l0 percentage points in North America and Europe (see
Table
l). in Japan it fell by abouL l percentage point between 1979 and
1989.
Japan's current account deficit swung from a 197gdeficit of about 1!0 of
its GDP to a surplus of 'Io in 1989. while in NorthAmerica the current
account deficit rose from almost 0 to 2oJo of GDP.
This paper investigates the relation between budgetary policies, eco-
nomic growth, and current account imbalances, in the context ofa theoreti-
cal two-country model of endogenous growth with overlapping
genera-
tions. The analysis assumes capital mobility and focuses on interaational
spillovers from capital accumulation. .
We demonstrate that. in the presence of perfect capital mobility, the
endogenous growth rate will be the same in all countries and that relative
output levels will not converge. Relative outputs and capital stocks are
determined by exogenous differences in productive efficleacy. The reason
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for the equality of the endogenous growth rate is the real interest rate
equalization implied by perfect capital mobility. As a result, the marginal
product of capital must be the same in both countries. Capital will flow
into the country with the more efficient productive technology until the
marginal product of capital stock has been equalized in the two countries.
After that, capital stocks need to grow by the same percentage to maintain
this equality. Since the rate of growth of the capital siock determines the
growth rate in this endogenous growth model, growth rates will then be
equal. .
With regard to the world economy we demonstrate that savings
and growth rates are lower than those in a comparable representative-
household economy. This is because in our overlapping-generations model
households are not concerned about the welfare of yet unborn agénts and
therefore save less. Since the savings rate determines the rate of capital
accumulation. and the tatter determines the :rowth rate. growth will be
slower in an overlapping-~enerations economy. We also demonstrate that
the growth rate falls with increases in both the average public debt to GDP
ratio and the average GDP share of public consumption. This is because
both reduce global savings and, hence, capital accumulation. Such growth
effects do not arise in representative-household economies (see Alo-
goskoufis and van der Ploeg, 1990a). ~-
With regard to differences between countries, we demonstrate that
relative increases in the public debt to GDP ratios and the GDP share of
public consumption produce a relative fall in the share of external assets
to GDP for the country that experiences them. This is because of the fall
in its savings rate (private plus public). On impact. the fall in the national
savines rate is higher than in steady state, and the economy enters an
adjustment pa[h along which it experiences hieher current account deficits
and a rising external debt to GDP ratio.
In conclusion. the results suggest that a two-country overlapping-
generations model of endoeenóus erowth can account for the events of
the 1980s in terms of budgetary policies. The fall in thé global growth rate
could be a result of the averaee rise in public debt to GDP ratios, and the
higher current account deficits of countries such as the United States
could be the reflection of the relative rise in public deficits and public
debt that they experienced. This latter result is also obtained in exogenous
growth, overlapping-generations models, but such models cannot account
for the growth et~ects of budeetary policies (see Frenkel and Razin. 1988:
Obstfeld, 1988. van der Ploeg, 1990: Alogoskoufis. 1990: among
others).
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section I presents an open economy
modzl uf overlapping generations and endogenous growth. The household
sector consists of households with infinite horizons, but there is entry of
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new households that are not intergenerationally linked. as in Weil (1989).
This creates a consumption externality, as current households are not
concerned with the welfare of future generations and save less than other-
wise. Since savings determine investment in equilibrium, the investment
rate is inefficiently low. The product market is competitive, but there are
production externalities from the capital stock (or "knowledge") of other
firms at home and abroad. Because of these production externalities, the
marginal productivity of capital for individual firms is lower than the
social margiral productivity of capital. and the equilibrium capital stock is
inefficiently low. The government finances public consumption by either
lump-sum taxes or public debt. It is assumed throughout that the govern-
ment is solvent. Section II considers a two-country world in~which both
countries produce goods that are perfect substitutes in consumption. There
are no barriers to international trade in goods or capital. We derive the
zquiiibrium. discuss its properties, and consider [he e[fects of alternative
budgetary policies on the global growth rate and external debt. Section III
contains conclusions.
I. AN OPEN ECONOMY MODEL OF ~VERLAPPING GENERATIONS AND
EVDOGENOUS GROWTH
Consider a world economy with no barriers to trade and in which each
individual economy produces goods that are perfect substitutes in con-
sumption. As a consequence, the law of one price holds.
Each economy consists of a large number of competitive firms, and a
popula[ion of infinitely lived households which grows at the rate ,i. The
eovernment spends on public goods and can levy lump-sum taxes and
issue debt.
I. l. Households and Aggregate Consumption
The basic model is a variant of the Weil (1989) model of overlapping
infinitely lived households. New cohorts are not linked to preexisting
cohorts through operative bequests.'
' The infinite honzon assumption is not crucial. One could allow for 6aite horizons along
the lincs of the Blanchard (19851-Yaari ( 1965) model, but the extn complexity buys Gttle in
cerms of additional results. As Weil ( t989) and Buiter (1988) have shown, the ctvcial differ-
ence between a representative-huusehold and an overlapping-generatioas model u not finite
. crsus infini[e horizons. but rather the prospecáve arrival of new cohorts that are ttot litilced
to exis[ing cohoru through operaeive bequests.
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At time t, a household born at instant u solves the problem
max Js e-a''" In[c(u, s)]ds
c(u, s) ~




r(t)a(v, t) f w(v, t) - r(u, t) - c(u, t), (2)
where c is consumption, a is nonhuman wealth, w is the gross instanta-
neous nonasset income of the household, and r is the instantaneous tax
she pays to the government. p is the pure rate of time preference and r is
the instantaneous real interest rate.
tnder the requirement ;hat households are solvent (no Ponzi gamesl
and that the real interest rate is time invariant, as is shown to be the case
in equilibrium, one obtains the utility-maximizing consumption function
for the individual household.'
c(v, t) - p[a(u, t) -I- h(v, t)], (3)
where h(u, t) denotes human wealth. This is defined as
h(u, t) - Js e~~''`'[w(v, s) - z(v, s)]ds.
r
(4)
In what follows we assume that newly born households do not inherit
anv nonhuman wealth. but that the other income w and taxes r are indepen-
dent of the age of the household. Aggregate consumption is given by C(t)
-~f`~ c(v, t)e""du. It is straightforward to show that aggregate consump-
tion and nonhuman wealth evolve according to
C(t) -[r - p f n]C(t) - npA(t) (5)
A(t) - rA(t) f ft(t) - T(t) - C(t). (6)
- The results that we derive in this paper are robust to more general specifications of the
utility function. For the CES utilit}~ tunction, the household consumption function is modified
to the form c(u, t) ~ [ap t~(1 - ulrj[u(v, t) t h(u, r)), wherc v is the elasticity of
intenemporal substitution. 1f households faced a constant probability of death a, as in
Blanchard ( I983). the consumption function would be c(u, t) ~[v(p t A) t(I - axr t
a)j[u(v. r) t h(u, r)j. Alogoskoutis and van de~ Ploeg (1990b) analyze such a model of
endogenous growth and overtapping generations.
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The menu of assets held by households consists of physical capital K.
government debt D, and external assets F.
I.2. Technology and the Behauior of Firms
Each economy consists ofa large number of identical competitive firms.
The objective of these firms is to maximize their net worth.
Technology of firm j is given by
y(j. t) - Bk(j. t)"~K(t)"-K:(t)I-",-"~, e 10. 0 c~II f~iz c l. (7)
where d, rii , and rl, are constant technological parameters, k(j, t) denotes
the capital stock of firm j at instant t, K(t) denotes the average capital
stock in [he economy, and K'(t) denotes the average foreign capital stock.
These two latter terms capture the external (or knowledge) effects of
ae~reoate capital deepening in the economy and the rest of the world.
:~rrow I 1962) and Romer ~ 1986) have stressed such external effects in the
context of a closed economy. Our model is the special case of the Romer
model with constant returns to aggregate capital accumulation at the world
level. Romer ( t989) surveys the rapidly expanding literature on endogc-
nous growth.
Firm j chooses a path for its capital stock that solves the problem
: -J~~~,a~
max j[y( j, u) - k(j, u) - Sk(j, u)]e ~ du. (8)
k( j, u) ~
The terms in brackets denote the instantaneous profits of firmj. 8 is the
rate of depreciation of the capital stock.
The first-order condition for a maximum entails
r(t) - ~7~8(K:( )~"'-I`K()I". -
S. (9)
Equation (9) is the condition that the marginal prodttct of capital is equal
to [he user cost of capital r t S. Since all domestic firms have the same
technology and face the same market and nonmarket constraints (real
interest rate and average domestic and foreign capital stocks), they will
all choose the same capital stock. Thus, in domestic equilibrium. k(j, t)
- K(t) for all firms. The domestic asset market equilibrium coadition then
is
r(t) - ~le K(t) "-~ - S, - (10)(K (t)
where ,l - ~I f ~Z.
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On the other hand, when (7) is aggregated across firms, the domestic
ag~regate production function is.
Ylt) - 6Klt)~K'(t)'-~. (il)
I.3. The Government
The government finances public consumption G and interest payments
on its debt rD by either lump-sum taxation T or borrowing D. This gives
rise to the flow budget identity of the government,
D(t) - rD(t) ~- G(t) - T(t). (12)
Solvency of the government requires that the sum of the current public
debt and the present value of future public consumption do noi exceed the
present value of future taxes:
(je-"'-nG(s)ds f D(t)~ Jse-~,-'IT(s)ds. (l2')
J, ~
II. ENDOGENOUS GROWTH. SAVINGS. AND EXTERNAL DEBT
Consider a two-couniry world. Preferences are the same in both coun-
tries. and there are no barriers to goods or capital 8ows across countries.
Since the goods produced in any country are perfect substitutes in con-
sumption, the law of one price will hold. Also, since assets are perfect
substitutes internationally, both countries will face the same real interest
rate.
We assume two differences across countries. The first is in the marginal
productivity of capital, and is parametrized in terms Qf differences in 9's.
The second difference refers to fiscal policies. Countries are indexed by
subscript i, where i- l.2. ~
lI.l. Asset Market Bquilibrium
The condition of perfect capital mobility implies that real interest rates
will be equal across countries. From (10) and the assumption that the
parameter 9 differs across countries, we get that the world interest rate
and relative capital intensities are determined by the condition that
~K~(t)l~-i ~K~(t)`i-~
r(t) - ~I~e~ K,(t)J
- S - ~liez Kz(t)i1
- S. (13)
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Equation (13) can be solved for the equilibrium world real interest rate
and the ratio of the equilibrium capital stocks:
r(t) - ~7i(BiB,)'n - S (14)
K~ ei vui - ~t
K, - 9,) (15)
From ( l4)ti the equilibrium world equilibrium real interest rate is time
invariant as was assumed in Section I.1. It depends positively on the
parameters determinine [he marginal productivity of capital stocks and
negatively on the rate of depreciation of capital.
From ( IS), the country. that, ceteris paribus, is more productive in its
use of capital will end up with the higher capital stock. Substituting (15)
in the asgre:ate production function ((1). we get the equilibrium aegregate
production functions
Y~ - (6~8.)'~-Kt (16a)
Y: - (6i8:)'~'K:. (16b)
Equations (16a) and ( lób) imply that, in equilibrium, the two economies
will have the same capital-output ratio, which is constant and determined
by the geometric averaee of B~ and 9:. In both countries. equilibrium
output turns out to be proponional [o the aggregate capital stock.
Ifgrowth in the level of domestic product is deóned as y;(t) ~ Y;(t)I Y;(t).
then, from aggregate production functions ( lóa) and (16b), the growth rates
of the capital stocks are also equal to y;(t). Since from ( l5) the equilibrium
ratio of capital stocks is constant, it follows that the equilibrium growth
rates in the two economies must be equal. Thus, in this model there is no
convergence of output Izvels. "Poor" (low-9) countries-have a lower
output and capital stock [han "rich" (high-B) couptries, but a common
growth rate. Hence output levels do not converge. The rate of change of
labor-augmenting technical progress. or the per capita growth rate, is
defined as ~r(t) á y(r) - n. To the extent that both countries have the
same rate of population growth, per capita outpu[ neither converges nor
diverges. However, if the poor country had a higher rate of population
growth. then per capita uutput would diverge between rich and poor.
Cumbine ( lóa), (16b). and ( l4) and note that (r t S)K;(t) -
r(,(B,B:)1I2K;(t) ~ Y;(t). Domestic output exceeds payments to owners of
private capital. This is because domestic and intérnational spillovers of
knowledge induce additional income for which individual firms do not
need to pay. We assume that these profits are handed over to the ownecs
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of the firms (the household sectors) in a manner that does not depend on
their age. This is consistent with our assumption in Section I.l that r,,(u,
t) - ri,(t), i.e, independent of the age of the household. Therefore. ft(t) -
(1 - ~,) Y(t).
To summarize, this section has demonstrated that the equilibrium world
real interest rate depends only on- exogenous technological parameters.
The relative capital stocks and output levels of the two economies depend
onlv on differences in production efficiency and the capital-output ratio
being the same in both countries. It has also demonstrated that the growth
rate of GDP will be the same in both countries. and that there will be no
tendency for economic convergence.~
II.'. Guods and Labor rllarket Equilrbrirtm
Equilibrium in product markets rquires that the sum of private consump-
tion. public consumption. and investment equal national income. National
income consists of domestic income Y, plus interest payments on external
assets. Thus, in each economy. the product market equilibrium condition
is
Y;(t) f rF;(t) - C;(t) f K;(t) t SK;(t) ~- G,(t) -} F;(t). (17)
Equation (17) is based on the familiar accounting identity in an open
economy, that national income is equal to absorption plus the trade bal-
ance. The trade balance is equal to the accumulation of external assets.
Equation ( l7) can be rearranged to give the 8ow budget identity for the
economy as a whole:
!C;(t) ~- F;(t) - Y;(t) - rF;(t) - C;(t) t SK;(t) - G;(t). (17')
The accumulation of capital and foreign assets is equal to the excess of
net national income over privàte and government consumption.
II.3. Summary
It is convenient to formulate the two-country model in terms offractions
ofdomestic product. These fractions are denoted by lowercase rather than
capital letters. i.e, c(t) - C(t)I Y(t). The model then is as follows:
' The equality of growth rates follows from. the assumption that the capital stock is
internationally tradeable and freel~~ adjustable. !n Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (19911 we
demonstra[e that in thc presence uf adjustment costs for investment, thc country facing the
highcr adjustment costs grows more slowly. Differcnccs in grówth ratcs are the main focus
of the papcr of Buiter and Kletzer 119911. where endogenous growth is due to the accumula-
tion of nontradeablc human capital.
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c;(t) -[r - p f n- y(t)]c;(t) - np[k t d;(t) ~- f(t)], (18)
d;(t) -[r - y(t)]d;(t) -F g; - T;. d;(0) - d,~, (19)
Í;(t) - I-[y(t) t SJk - c;(t) - 8r f[r - Y~(t)]f , (20)
k - B-~, B - (9,8,)12, (21)
~,. ~ ~:1;(t) - 0. (22)
Equations (18)-(20) are. respectively. the consumption function, the
government How budget identity, and the product market equilibrium
condition for each economy. We have used the equilibrium condition that
the rates of growth of capital stocks and. therefore, the growth rates are
the same for both countries. Equation (21) is the equilibrium capital-out-
put ra[io. which i~ the same in both countries and equal to the geometric
average of B, and H,. Finally, (2') is derived from the familiar budget
identity that the foreign borrowing of country I equals the foreign lending
of country 2. ~; is the share of country i's GDP in world GDP. The GDP
shares are time independent in this model. It is straightforward to show
that ~, - lI[1 t (B,IB,)'"1-" -A'I]. Obviously ~: - 1 - ~,.
The simplest way to solve the model is to use the method~of Aoki (1981)
and consider the model of averages and the model of differences.
II.4 Budgetary Policies. Sauings, and Endogenous Growth in the
World Economy
We first consider the determination of worldwide averages. By taking
the weighted average of the consumption functions (18), the government
ftow-budeet identities ( 191. and the product market equilibrium conditions
('01 for the two countries. using as weights their respective shares in world
GDP. and after making use of (?1) and ("), we end up with the following
average model for the ~vor]d economy:
c~(t ) - [r - p t n - y(t )]cA(t ) - np(B-
i ~ dA(t)~. (23)
d~(t) -[r - ylt)]d~(t) t 8~ - Tn. d~(0) - d~. (24)
y(t) --S t d[l - cA(t) - S'Al. (25)
Subscript A denotes that the relevant variables refer to global weighted
averages. Note that we have made use of (21) to substitute for the average
capi[al-output ratio and ("), which suggests that áverage external assets
are zero.
We first consider the determination of the GDP share of world private
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Fie. 1. The effects of budgetary policies on world consumption and growth rates.
consumption and the endogenous world growth rate, under the assumption
of a constant world public debt to GDP ratio. This will be under the
assumption that taxes adjust instantaneously to stabilize public debt. Thus.
we concentrate on (23) and (25), assuming that the share of taxes is
determined by
r~(~) - I~ - Y(~)]d~(r) t 8~- (24~)
World equilibrium is depicted in Fig. l. D-R depicts the steady-state
consumption function in this Diamond (1965)-Romer (1986) overlapping-
generations model. It is the locus of consumption-growth combinations
that are consistent with the plans of private consumers and a constant
GDP share of private consumption. Assuming a dynamically efficient
world economy, in which the real interest rate exceeds the pure rate of
time preference. i.e, that ,~,9- S~ p, the D-R locus is defined for per
capita growth rates lower than r1,8 - S- p. The steady;state consumption
function asymptotically approaches the vertical R-R locus. which repre-
sents the Ramsey (1928~Romer (1986) condition that the world per capita
growth rate is equal to the difference between the real interest rate and
the pure rate of preference. This condition, the modióed golden rule. is
satisfied at the point y' - n f r1i8 - S- p.
The downward-sloping H-D line is the product market equilibrium
condition (25). It is essentially a modified Harrod (1948)-Domaz (195~
condition for the world economy. Ceteris paribus, a lower share ofprivate
consumption to world output leaves more room for investment, and the
higher investment rate produces more growth. Unlike the model with
decreasing returns to aggregate capital, growth never ceases in this model.
316 ALOGOSKOUFIS AND VAN DER PLOEG
World equilibrium is at Eo, the intersection of the D-R and H-D loci.
Since both consumption and growth rate are nonpredetermined variables,
there are no transient dynamics in the case of a fixed public debt to GDP
ratio. Private consumption and the growth rate jump to ensure equilibrium
in the global economy.
The equilibrium share of consumption ís higher and the equilibrium
growth rate lower than those in the case of an infinite horizon, representa-
tive-household global economy. This is because of the entry of new,
nonintergenerationally linked households, which creates a consumption
externality. Without this externality, the equilibrium is at E', the intersec-
tion of the H-D and R-R loci. In the representative household economy,
the only growth rate which is compatible with a constant GDP share of
private consumption is the Ramsey-Romer growth rate, y' - n f,7iB -
S- p. In that case, only policies that operate through the marginal product
of capital can affect growth rates.
We turn now co [wv fiscal policy experiments. The first is a tax-financed,
steady-state rise in the world public debt to GDP ratio, and the second is
a global balanced-budget increase in government consumption.
A globa! rise in the public debt-GDP ratio shifts the D-R locus to
the left. Higher public debt increases consumption at a given growth
rate, as part of the lump-sum taxes that will finance the interest payments
on the higher public debt are paid by yet unborn generations, for which
current generacions are not concerned. In equilibrium. the rise in world
consumption will reduce the growth rate, as it crowds out capital
accumulation. Thus, the new equilibrium at E[ is associated with higher
private consumption and a lower growth rate. Such an effect does not
arise in the case of a represeniative-household global economy, as in
this case government bonds are not wealth (Barro, 1974), and the
method of financing government expenditure does not affect private
consumption.
A balanced budget global rise in the share of government consumption
shifts the H-D locus. ln che new equilibrium E,,~both private consump-
tion and the growth rate fall relative to the original equilibrium at Eo.
The higher taxes used to finance the rise in government consumption
crowd out private consumption, but this crowding out is less than one
for one, since part of the higher taxes are paid by new, nonintergenera-
tionally linked households. As a result of this. the sum of global private
and government consumption rises, total savings and investment get
crowded out, and the growth rate falls. Such an efiect does not arise
in the representative-household economy, in which there is one-for-one
crowding out of private consumptioa. In that case the economy moves
from E' to E".
In Appendix 1 we consider the dynamics of consumption, public debt,
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and economic growth, if taxes adjust only gradually, raiher than immedi-
ately, to stabilize the global public debt to GDP ratio.
To summarize, this section has investigated the determination of global
savings and endogenous growth. We demonstrated thai the world savings
and growth rates are lower than in a representative-household global
economy, and that increases in both public debt and government consump-
tion reduce the worid GDP share of total savings and the global growth
rate.
We now turn to the effects of differences in fiscal policies between
countries.
II.S. Relatiue Budgetary Policies and Ezternal Debt
The model of differences between countries is used to examine the
efiects of relative budgetary policies in the two countries.
Subtracting the model (18)-(20) of country 2 from the model of country
1, we get the model of differences
~R(t) -[r - p f n- y]cle(t) - np[dR(t) }fiz(t)], (26)
dR(t) -[r - y~dR(t) f óR - 7R, dR(0) - dR~~ (27)
IR(t) - [r - yIIR - [CR(t) f óR~, (ZÓ)
where subscript R denotes the difference of ihe relevant ratio between
country 1 and country 2.
We again concentrate on experiments with constant relative public debt
to output ratios. Thus. relative tax rates are assumed to adjust instaniane-
ously to stabilize the relative public debt to GDP ratios. . Appendix 2
examines the stability of the relative model when the relative tax rates
adjust sluggishly.
With a constant relative public debt to GDP ratio, the model consists of
(26) and (28). It determines fhe differences in GDP shares of private
consumption and the differences in net external assei lo GDP ratios.
The equilibrium is depicted in Fig. 2. The constant relative consumption
locus has a positive slope, as in world equilibrium y c r- p f n. If the
rclative public debt to GDP ratio of country I is positive, it will also have
a positive intercept. The slope of the locus of constant relative foreign
assets could be either positive or negative, depending on whether the real
intercst rate exceeds or falls short of the growth rate. The case depicted
in Fig. 2 is based on the assumption that r 1 y. It is also assumed that the
GDP share of public consumption in country 1 is higher than that in
country 2.
The necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be sad-
dlepoint stable is that
318 ALOGOSKOUFIS AND VAN DER PLOEG
cR- 0
r-~
Fic. '. Equilibrium of relative consumption and foreign assets.
np 1[r - p -1- n- y)[r - y). (29)
This condition will be satisfied if individual households are. solvent and is
assumed in Fig. 2.
We next consider the implications of a tax-financed rise in the relative
debt to GDP ratio of councry 1 and a tax-financed increase in its relative







Fic. 3. (a) A tax-ónanced steady-stau iacrease ia rclative public debt (b) A ta~[-óaancsd
steady-state iaaease in rclative pubGc eoasumption.
(A- 0
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Figure 3a depicts the case of a steady-state increase in the public debt
to GDP ratio of country 1. relative to country 2. This shifts the constant
relative consumption locus to the left. and the new equilibrium E' is
associated with lower relative consumption and a higher external debt
for country l. Initially relative consumption rises as it jumps to put the
economies at E~ on the negatively sloping saddlepath. Subsequently, the
relative share of private consumption is falling as country 1 decumulates
foreign assets (accumulates foreign debt). Thus the adjustment path is
characterized by higher than steady state relative consumption forcountry
1 and a current account deficit.
Figure 3b depicts the case of a relative increase in the share of govern-
ment consumption in country 1. This shifts the constant foreign assets
locus to the right, and in the new steady-state equilibrium. country l has
a lower relative ratio of private consumption to GDP and a higher external
debt. The initiall fall in relative consumption undershoots the steady-state
faU. However, as there is decumulation offoreign assets (accumulation of
foreign debt) along the new saddlepath, the relative consumption share
gradually approaches its lower equilibrium value at E'.
To rccapitulate, we have shown that in a world of full capital mobility,
an increase in the public debt to GDP ratio in one couatry will cause
a reduction in that country's relative GDP share of private (and national)
savings to GDP and a rise in its external debt to GDP ratio. On impact,
the reduction in private savings is higher than in steady state, and the
economy enters an adjustment path along which it experiences higher
current account de6cits and a rising external debt to GDP ratio. On the
other hand, a(relative) rise in the output share of public consumption
also reduces national savings, as the reduction in the (relative) GDP
share of private consumption is lower than the increase in share of
public consumption. As on impact the fall in the relative GDP share of
private consumption undershoots the steady-state fall, the economy
experiences an adjustment pach characterized by higher current account
deficits, a rising external debt to GDP ratio, and 3 jalling GDP share
of private consumption.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the implications of budgetary policies for
growth and international borrowing and lending. in a two-country model
of overlapping generations and endogenous growth. It has demonstrated
that in the preseace of perfect capital mobility, endogenous growth rates
are equalized across countries, and that per capita output levels do not
coaverge.
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A rise in average public debt to GDP ratios or the average GDP share
of public consumption reduces the global growth rate. The average GDP
share of private consumption rises followíng a rise in the average public
debt-GDP ratio, while it falls following a rise in the GDP share of public
consumption. However, in the latter case, there is less than full crowding
out, and this is the reason that the global savings rate falls and growth
slows down.
A relative rise in the public debt to GDP ratio in one country causes
a reduction in its external assets to GDP ratio. Its relative GDP share
of private ~consumption rises, but then gradually falls as the country
experiences higher current account deficits and decumulates foreign
assets. In the new steady state, its relative savings rate will be either
higher or lower than before the change, depending on whether the real
interest rate exceeds the growth rate or vice versa. A relative rise in
the GDP share of public consumption in one country will cause a
relative reduction in the GDP share of private consumption. However.
as there is less than full crowding out, because of overlapping genera-
tions, the country's relative national savings rate will fall. This will
bring about higher current account deficits and a gradual reduction in
its external assets to GDP ratio. This reduction will cause a gradua!
rise in its relative GDP share of private savings, which will eventually
stop the external asset decumulation.
This model goes a long way toward accounting for the events of the
1980s. It not only explains the decumulation of external assets in the
United States, relative to those in Western Europe and Japan, but it also
explains the global slowdown in growth.
APPENDIX I
The Dynamic Adjustment of World Sauings, Public Debt, and
Endogenous Growth
In this appendix we consider the effects of a transitory tax cut on the
dynamic adjustment of the average GDP share of private consumption,
public debt, and endogenous growth in the worid economy. For this pur-
pose we use the average model consisting of Eqs. (23) to (2S). We supple-
ment the model by a tax rule that is assumed to ensure solvency of the
public sector. This tax rule takes the form
TA(l) - Tp f T~dA(t). (Al)
Equations (A1) substitutes the tax rule (24') in the text. Unlike (24'), which
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Ftc. 4. Dynamics of avera~el public debt and private consumption.
assumes immediate adjustment to ensure a stable public debt to GDP ratio.
(AI) implies gradual adjustment.
Substituting (A1) in (24) and growth rate eq. (25) in (23) and (24), we
obtain the following model for the average GDP share of private consump-
tion and the average public debt to GDP ratio:
~A(~) -[r - p t n f S- B(1 - 8A)]cA(t) f Bc~(t) - np[9-~ ~ dA(t)l
dA(i) -[r f S- e(1 - óA) - 71~dA(1) f BCA(~)dA(t) f éA - Tp.
(A2)
(~)
The condition for government solvency is that r~ ~ r- yA - r f S-
6( l - cA - gA).
The equilibrium and the associated dynamics are depicted in Fig. 4. The
locus associated with a constal~t share of consumption is negatively sloped
for low shares of private consumption, since a low share of private con-
sumption leaves more room for investment. This results in a per capita
growth rate that is higher than ihe difference of the real interest rate and
the pure rate of time preference weighted by the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. The slope of the locus turns positive at the point where the
share of consumption is high eaough to ensure a per capita growth rate
lower than this latter difference. This is at the point c~ -} c'. c' - 1-
gA - 9' t[r - p t n t SJ denotes the equilibrium GDP share ofconsump-
tion associated with the Ramsey-Romer rule, i.e., a representative housc-
hold economy. } c' also denotes the minimum average public debt to GDP
ratio, or the highest percentage of GDP that the private sector is prepared
to borrow from governments. Note that the Ramsey-Romer share of
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Fic. S. Dynamic adjustment o[ average consumption, debt, and growth after a temporary
tax cut.
ptivate consumption is an equilibrium in the model with overlapping gener-
ations when governments hold assets equal to the average private capital
stock, d~ - - ile.
The locus associated with a constant average pubGe debt to GDP ratio
slopes upward as long as c~ does not exceed c" - 1- g~ f 9-~(rt -
r- S). This is the condition for government solvency. --
There aze three potential equilibria. E~ can be ruled out because it
implies negative average world consumption, whereas E: is unsiable.
Therefore, Ej is the only meaningful steady-state equilibrium, as it is
saddlepoint stable, which is sensible since d~ is a predetermined variable
and c~ a nonpredetermined variable. Eo is the steady-state equilibrium
in the representative-household economy. In comparing E~ and Eo one
notes that the absence of an intergenerational bequest motive leads to
a higher GDP share of private consumption and a higher public debt to
GDP ratio.
Intertemporal shifts in tàxation do not affect the GDP share of private
consumption in the representative-household ecónomy. This is because
of Ricardian neutraGty. Such shifts affect only the average public debt
to GDP ratio (i.e., shifts along the R-R curve). In our overlapping-
generations model, a cut in ro shifts the d~ - O locus to the right, increases
the share of private consumption to GDP. reduces the growth rate, and
increases the public debt to GDP ratio (Fig. S). The short-run effects
imply an increase in private consumption (shift from E to A), because
part of the future taxes will be paid by yet unborn generations. As a
result, global savings and the growth rate fall on impact. Over time,
there is a rise of the average public debi to GDP ratio that causes further
reductions in the savings rate and the growth rate. It also induces inereases
in the share of taxes (through (AI)), which in ihe end bring us to the new
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steady-state E', with a higher share of consumption and a lower growth
rate.
APPENDIX 2
The Dynamic Adjustment ofRelatiue Sauings. Externa! Debt, and
Relatlue Public Debt
In this appeadix we consider the stability of the relative model in
(26~(28), under gradual adjustment of relative tax rates to stabilize differ-
ences in the public debt to GDP ratio. Thus, the tax rule takes the form
TR - Tp f TIdA. (A4)
When (A4) is substituted in (27), the characteristic polynomial of the
amended dynamic system (~6)-(28) is given by
~(~) - (r - y - TI - Ec){~- - [2(r - y)
- p t njEs - np t(r - yxr - p t n- y)}. (AS)
Since the system consists of one nonpredetermined and two~predeter-
auned variables, saddlepath stability requires two stable (negative) roots
and one unstable ( positive) root. It is straightforwazd to see that in the
case where the public secton aze solvent, i.e., rt 1 r- y, saddlepath
stability is satisfied if (29) is also satisfied, i.e.. if the private sectors aze
also solvent. If the public sector is solvent, the root associated with public
debt is given by fet - r- y- rt c 0, while if the private sector is solvent,
((29) is satisfied), the product of the other two roots will be negative,
suggesting that one is negative and the other positive. Hence, the sad-
dlepath condition will be satisbed.
REFERENCES
ALOGOSCOUFIS. G. S. U990). "On Public Debt Stabi)izatioas in aa Iaterdepwdent World."
CEPR D'ucussioa Paper 490, Loadoa.
ALOGOSCOUFIS, G. S., AND VAN DEl PLOEG. F. (19901). "On BLLdgetiry POtiC1Ci ind
Ewaomic Growth." CEPR Discussioa Paper 196, I.atdon.
ALOGOSICOUFIS, G. S.. AND VAN DEE PLOEG, F. (1990Ó). "Eadogenous Growth and Ovedap-
ping Geacra[ioas." Discussion Paper 26I90, Birlcbeck CoUege. Uoivecsity o[ Loodon.
ALO('.OSCOUF[S, G. S., AND VAN DEA PLOEG, F. (l~l). "DCbIS, pe6cits aad Growch ia
Interdependeat Ecoaomies." CEPR Discussion Papu 533,.Loodon.
Aoat, M. (1981). "Dynamic Analysis in Op-.o Ecoaomies," Academic prtss, New Yoric.
324 ALOGOSKOUFIS AND VAN DER PLOEC3
AAAOw, K. J. (1962). Tbc economic impGcations of learning by doing, Ren. Econ. Stud. 29,
ISS-73.
Bwaao, R. J. (I974). Arc govcmmcnt bonds net wealth? J. Polir. Econ. á2, 1093-! 117.
BuNCttwAD. O. J. (1983). Dcbts, deficiu and 4nite horizons. J. PoGt. Econ. !3, 223-247.
BUITER. W. H. ( 1988). Death, birth, productivity growth and debt nwtrality. Econ. J. 98,
279-293.
BUITER. W. H., wND KLETZEA, K. (1991). "Persistcnt Díffercnces in National Productivity
Growth Rates, with a Common Technology and Frce Capital Mobility," Papcr prcsented
at the NBERICEPRITCER Confercnce on Fiscal PoGcies in Opca Macro Economics,
January 7 pnd 8, Tokyo.
DIAMOND, P. A. (1965), National debt in a neo-classical growth modcl, Amer. Econ. Rcv.
55, llZts-IISO.
DOMAA, E. D. (1957). "Essapt in rhe Theory oj Economic Growth," Ozford Univ. Press,
Oxford. -
FRENKEL, 1., AND RAIIN, A. (1988). "Piscal Policies in tht World Economy," MIT Prcss,
Cambridge. MA.
HwAROD, R. F. (1948). "Towards n Dynamic Economics," Macmillan. London.
OBSTFELD, M. (1988). Fiscal deficiu and relative prices in a growin~ world economy, J.
Montt. Econ. 23, 461-484.
RAMSEY, F. P. (1928). A mathematical theory of savings, Econ. J. 38, 543-559.
ROMER, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-ruo growth, J. Polit. Econ. 94, 1002-1037.
ROMER. P. M. (l989). Capital accumulation in the theory of long-run growth. in "Modern
Business Cycle Theory" (R. J. Barro, Ed.), Harvard Univ. Prcss, Cambridge, MA.
VAN DEA PLOEG. F. (1990). Money and capital in interdependent econon~ies with overlapping
gcncrations, Economica. in prcss.
WEtL. P. (1989). Overiapping funilies of infinitely lived agents.l. Publíc Econ. 3g, 183-198.
Y~wRt. M. ( 1965). Uncenain lifetime. life insurance and the theory ol the consumer, Reu.
Econ. Stud. 32, 137-ISO.
Repriot Series, CentER, Tilburg Uoiversfty, The Netherlaods:
No. 1 G. Marini and F. van der Plceg, Monetary and fisc-al poliry in an optimising
model with capital aocumulation and finite lives, 77u Econornic Joumal, voL 98,
no. 392, 1988, pp. 772 - 786.
No. 2 F. van der Plceg, Intunational poliry ooordination in intudependent monetary
economies, Jouma! oj Intanaáo~na! Ecatontits, voL 25, 1986, pp. 1- 23.
No. 3 A.P. Barten, The history of Dutrh macroecdtomie modelling (1936-1986), in W.
Driehuis, M.M.G. Fase and H. den Hartog (eds.), ChaUe~gr,s for Maooocawntic
Mode!ling, Contrbutions to Eoonomic Analysis 178, Amsterdam: North-HoUand,
1988, pp. 39 - 88.
No. 4 F. van der Plceg, Disposable inoome, unemployment, inflation and state spending
in a dynamic political-0oonomic model, PubGc Choitt, voL 60, t989, pp. 211- 239.
No. S "ilt. ten Raa and F. van du Ploeg, A statistical approach to the problem of
negatives in input-output analysis, Econowtic ModeUing, vd. 6, no. 1, 1989, pp. 2
- 19.
No. 6 E. van Damme, Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' ddemma,
Journal oj Economic Theory, vol. 47, no. 1, 1989, PP. 206 - 217.
No. 7 C. Muldu and F. van der Plceg, Trade unions, investment and employment in
a smaU open eoonomy: a Dutch perspxtive, in ]. Muysken and C. de Neubourg
(eds.), Unanployrncnt in Europe, London: The Macmillan Press [,td, 1969, pp. 200
- 229.
No. 8 Th. van de Klundert and F. van du Plceg, Wage rigidity and ppital mobility in
an optimizing model of a smaU open eoonomy, De Eco~omist, vol. 137, nr. 1,
1989, pp. 47 - 75.
No. 9 G. Dhaene and A.P. Barten, When it aU began: the 1936 Tinbergen model
revisited, Economic ModeUing, vol. 6, no. 2, 1989, PP. 203 - 219.
No. 10 F. van der Plceg and AJ. de Zeeuw, Conflict over arms ao~umulation in market
and command economies, in F. van du Plceg and AJ. de Zeeuw (eds.), D~rwmic
Policy Garnts èn Economics, Contributions to Economic Analysis 181, Amster-
dam: ELsevier Scienoe Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1989, pp. 91 - I19.
No. i l J. Driffill, Macrooconomic policy games with incomplete information: some
artensions, in F. van der Plceg and AJ. de Zeeuw (eds.), Dynamic Policy Games
in Economics, Contributions to Economic Analysis 181, Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science Publishas B.V. (North-HoUand), 1989, pp. 289 - 322.
No. 12 F. van der Plceg, Towards monetary integration in Europe, in P. De Grauwe et
al., De Europtse Mo~etaire Iru~grruuie: vitr visiu, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid V Ci6, 's-Gravenhage: SDU uitgeverij, 1989, pp. 81 - 106.
No. 13 RJ.M. Alessie and A. Kapteyn, Consumption, aavings and denwgrapfty, in A.
Wcnig, ICF. Zimmertnann (eds.), Drmogrvphic t~angr and Economic
Devdoprtu.nt, Berlin~Heidelberg. Springer-Verlag, 1989, pp. 272 - 305.
No. 14 A. Hoque, I.R Magnus and B. Peaaran, The e~rad multi-period mean-square
[orecast error for the furst-order autoregessive model,lowno! ojEcorwmcdicr,
vol. 39, no. 3, 1988, pp. 327 - 346.
No. tS R. Alessie, A- Kapteyn and B. Melenberg, T7te effects of liquidity oonstraints on
consumption: estimation from household panel data, F.uropeen Economic Rtvitw,
vol. 33, no. 2~3, 1989, pp. 547 - SSS.
No. 16 A. HoUy and J.R. Magnus, A note on instrumental vuiables and ma~titnum likeli-
hood estimation procedures, Aturalrs d'Économie et de Statistiqut, no. ]0,
April-lune, 1988, PP. 121 - 138.
No. 17 P. ten Hacken, A. Kapteyn and I. Woittiez, Unemployment benefits and the
labor market, a micro~maao approach, in BA. Gustafsson and N. Anders
Klevmarken (eds.), The Political Economy oj Socïd Seewiry, Contrbutions to
Economic Analysis 179, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
(North-HoOand), 1989, pp. 143 - 164.
No. 18 T. Wansbeek and A. Kapteyn, Estimation of the errortromponents model with
incomplete panels, Joumal oj Econo~tsudier, voL 41, no. 3, 1989, pp. 341 - 361.
No. 19 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman and R. WiUemse, Some methodological issues in the
implementation of subjective poverty defmitions, Tl~c Jouma! oj ilumatr
Resources, vol. 23, no. 2, 1988, pp. 222 - 242.
No. 20 Th. van de Klundert and F. van der Ploeg, F~scal policy and Cutite lives in
interdependent economies with real and nominal wage rigidity, OrfordEconornic
Papers, vol. 41, no. 3, 1989, pp. 459 - 489.
No. 21 J. R. Magnus and B. Pesaran, The exau multi-period mean-square forecast error
for the first-order autoregessive model with an interoept, lourna! of
Econometrier, vol. 42, no. 2, 1989, pp. 1S7 - 179.
No. 22 F. van der Ploeg, Two essays on political eoonomy: (i) The political eonnomy of
overvaluation, T1u Economic Joutnal, voL 99, no. 397, 1989, pp. 850 - SSS; (ii)
Eledion outcomes and the stockmarket, Europaanlourna!ojPolitiool Ecorwrrty,
vol. 5, no. 1, 1989, pp. 21 - 30.
No. 23 J.R. Magnus and A.D. Woodland, On the maximum liltelihood estimation of
multivariate regession models oontaining serially correlated error oomponents,
Intematéona! Economic Review, voL 29, no. 4, 1988, pp. 707 - 725.
No. 24 A.JJ. Talman and Y. Yamamoto, A simplicial algorithm for stationary point
problems on polytopes, Mathenwtics oJ Opemtion.s Resea~rJ~, voL 14, no. 3, 1989,
pp. 383 - 399.
No. 25 E. van Damme, Stable equilibria and forward indudion, Jowna! of Ecorwtrtic
Theory, vol. 48, no. 2, 1989, pp. 476 - 496.
No. 26 A.P. Barten and LJ. Bettendorf, Prict formation of fish: An application of an
im,eru demand rystem, Europran Econoinic Rrnew, vol. 33, no. 8, 1989, pp. 1509
- 1S2S.
No. 27 G. Noldeke and E. van Damme, Signalling in a dynamic labour market, Revi~w
of Ecorwmic Sd~dies, vol. S7 (1~ no. 189, 1990, pp. 1- 23.
No. 28 P. Kop Jansen and Th. ten Raa, 73te choioe of modd in the construction of
inputoutput ooefïtcienu matrioes, Inranadorw! Bconanic Review, voL 31, no. 1,
1990, pp. 213 - 227.
No. 29 F. van der Ploeg and AJ. de Zoeuw, Perfect equihbrium in a model of
oompetitive arms aocumulation, Intanotional F.caantic Review, voL 31, no. 1,
1990, pp. 131 - 146.
No. 30 J.R. Magnus and A.D. Woodland, Separabnlity and aggregation, Econoarica,vol.
S7, no. 226, 1990, pp. 239 - 247.
No. 31 F. van der Pbeg, Intemational interdependence and policy coordination in
coonomies with real and nominal wage rigidity, Cnxk Econornic Revicw, vol. 10,
no. 1, June 1988, pp. 1- 48.
No. 32 E. van Damme, Signaling and forward induction in a market entry oonteut,
Opaotionr Resea~h Procsedings lAB9, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1990,
pp. 4S - S9.
No. 33 A.P. Barten, Toward a levels veruon of the Rotterdam and relatcd demand
systems, Condiburioru to Opertztiats Rrsearrh and Et.ononucs, Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1989, pp. 441 - 465.
No. 34 F. van der Ploeg, International coordination of monetary policies under
alternative exchange-rate regimes, in F. van der Ploeg (ed.), AdHancut Lecnues
in Quontirative F,corwmicr, London-Orlando: Academic Press Ltd., 1990, pp. 91
- 121.
No. 3S Th. van de Klundert, On socioooonomic causes of yvait unemployment', European
Ecorwrnic Review, voL 34, no. S, 1990, pp. 1011 - 1022.
No. 36 RJ.M. Alessie, A. Kapteyn, J.B. van [.ochem and TJ. Wansbeek, Individual
effetxs in utility consistent models of demand, in J. Hartog, G. Ridder and J.
Theeuwes ( eds.), Panef Dota and Labor Marker Sdrdies, Amsterdam: ELsevier
Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1990, pp. 2S3 - 278.
No. 37 F. van der Plceg, Capital accumulation, inflation and long-run conflict in
international objextives, OxfoM Econonuc Papers, vol. 42, no. 3, 1990, pp. SO1 -
S2S.
No. 38 Th. Nijman and F. Palm, Parameter identi6cation in ARMA Processes in the
presence of regular but incomplete sampling, loumalof Turu Sericc Analysit, vol.
I1, no. 3, 1990, pp. 239 - 248.
No. 39 Th. van de Klundert, Wage differentials and employment in a two-sector model
with a dual labour market, Meaoeconontica, vol. 40, no. 3, 1989, pp. 23S - 256.
No. 40 Th. Nijman and M.FJ. Steel, Exdusion restrictions in instrumental variabka
equations, Econornttric Reviews, vol. 9, no. 1, 1990, pp. 37 - SS.
No. 41 A. van Soest, l. Woittiez and A. Kapteyn, L~bor supply, incorne taxes, and hours
restrictions in the Netherlands, Jowrrttl ofHuman Ruouices, vol. 23, no. 3, 1990,
pp. S l7 - 558.
No. 42 Th.C.MJ. van de Klundert and A.B.T.M. van Schaik, Unemployment persistence
and loss of produdive capacity: a Keynesian approach, lounra! oj Macro-
economics, vol. 12, no. 3, 1990, pp. 363 - 380.
No. 43 Th. Nijman and M- Verbeek Estimation o[ time-dependeat parameters in linear
models using cross-sections, panels, or both, Joumal ojF.conomedics, voL 46, no.
3, 1990, pp. 333 - 346.
No. 44 E. van Damme, R. Selten and E. Winter, Alternating bid bargaining with a
smallest money unit, Gamu and Economic Bchavior, vol. 2, no. 2, 1990, pp. 188
- 201.
No. 45 C. Dang, Thc D,-triangulation of R' for simplicial algorithms for computing
solutions of nonlinear equations, Marhematics oJOperations Rueanch, vol. 16, no.
I, 1991, pp. 148 - 161.
No. 46 Th. Nijman and F. Palm, Predictive accuracy gain from dicaggregate sampling in
ARI MA modeLs, Jounwl ojBusi~usr dr Economic Staristier, voL 8, no. 4, 1990, pp.
405 - 415.
No. 47 1. R. Magnus, On certain moments relating to ratios ofquadratic forms in normal
variables: further results, Sankhln: 77u Indian Jouma! ojSraèsticr, vol. 32, series
B, part. 1, 1990, pp. 1- 13.
No. 48 M.FJ. Steel, A Bayesian analysis of simultaneous eqwtion models by oombining
recursive analytical and numerical approaches, Journa! ojEconomeaics, vol. 48,
no. 1~2, 1991, pp. 83 - 117.
No. 49 F. van der Plceg and C. Withagen, Pollution control and the ramsey problem,
Environnuntal ond Ruoruce Economics, vol. I, no. 2, 1991, pp. 215 - 236.
No. SO F. van der Ploeg, Money and capital in interdependent economies with
overlapping generations, Econornica, vol. 58, no. 230, 1991, pp. 233 - 256.
No. 51 A. Kapteyn and A- de Zeeuw, Changing incentives for economic research in the
Netherlands, European Econornic Revrew, vol. 35, no. 2~3, 1991, pp. 603 - 611.
No. 52 C.G. de Vries, On the relation between GARCH and stable processes, Jowrwl
of Economenicr, vo4 48, no. 3, 1991, pp. 313 - 324.
No. 53 R. Alessie and A. Kapteyn, Habit formation, interdependent preferenoes and
demographic effects in the almaat ideal demand system, The Economic lowrwl,
vol. 101, no. 406, 1991, pp. 404 - 419.
No. 54 W. van Groenendaal and A. de Zcetrvv, Control, coordination and oonflict on
international commodiry markets, Economic Moddling, vd. 8, ao. 1, 1991, pp. 90
- 101.
No. SS F. van der Ploeg and AJ. Mukink, Dynamic polic.y in linear models with rational
e~a.-tations of future events: A computu packagG Compuar Science ur
Economics and Managemeru, voL 4, no. 3, t991, pp. 175 - 199.
No. 56 H.A. Keuzenkamp and F. van du Plceg, Savings, iavestment, government
finance, and the current aooount-. The Dutch esperiuwe, in G. Alogoskoufis, L
Papademos and R. Portes (eds.), FstartalCortsdoints an Maaooconomic PoGcy:
77u Europeon F.rperience, Gmbridge: Gmbridge University Press, 1991, pp. 219
- 263.
No. S7 Th. Nijman, M. Verbeek and A. van Soest, 'Itte efficiency of rotating-panel
designs in an analysis-of-vuiance model,lountol ojEconowteaicr, voL 49, no. 3,
1991, pp. 373 - 399.
No. 58 M.FJ. Steel and J.-F. Richard, Bayesian multivariate exogeneiry analysis - an
application to a UK money demand equation, lownal of Ecorwmetricr, voL 49,
no. 1~2, 1991, pp. 239 - 274.
No. S9 Th. Nijman and F. Palm, Generalized least squares estimation of linear models
aontaining rational tuture expetxations, Inttmationo! Eoortomic Rtview, voL 32,
no. 2, 1991, pp. 383 - 389.
No. 60 E. van Damme, Equilrbrium selection in 2 x 2 games, Revïsta Erpwrola dt
Economia, vol. 8, no. 1, 1991, pp. 37 - S2.
No. 61 E. Bennett and E. van Damme, Demand commitment bargaining: the case of
apex games, in R. Selten (ed.), Game EquiGbriwn Modclr III - Saategic
Borgnining, Berlin: Springu-Vulag, 1991, pp. 118 - 140.
No. 62 W. Guth and E. van Damme, Gorby games - a game theoretic analysis of
disarmament campaigns and the defense efficiency - hypothesis -, in R.
Avenhaus, H. Karkar and M. Rudnianski (eds.), Dejenre Decision Maláng -
.Iiwlytical Support and Crisis Management, Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 1991, pp. 21S
- 240.
No. 63 A. Rcell, Dualcapaciry trading and the quality of the market, Joumol of
Fiiwncia! Intemiediotion, vol. 1, no. 2, 1990, pp. lOS - 124.
No.64 Y. Dai, G. van der Laan, AJJ. Talman and Y. Yamamoto, A simplicial
algorithm for the nonlinear stationary point proWem on an unbounded
polyhedron, Siam Joumal of Opánrization, vol. l, no. 2, 1991, pp. 1S1 - 165.
No. 6S M. McAleer and C.R. McKenzie, Keynesian and new classical models of
unemployment revisited, The Economic Jowrwl, vol. 101, no. 406, 1991, pp. 3S9
- 381.
No. 66 AJJ. Talman, General equilibrium programming, Nieuw Arrhicf voor Wisktutdc,
vol. 8, no. 3, 1990, pp. 387 - 397.
No.67 J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran, The bias of forecasts from a fust-0rder
autoregression, Economenic 77teory, vol. 7, no. 2, 1991, pp. 222 - 235.
No. 68 F. van der Plceg, Macroeoonomic policy coordination iswes during the various
phases of economic and monetary integration in Europe, Europtan Economy -
77u Economics oj EMU, Commission o[ the European Communities, special
edition no. 1, 1991, PP. 136 - 164.
No. 69 H. Keuzenkamp, A precursor to Muth: T'mbergen's 1932 modd of rational
expectations, The Economic Jownal, vol. 101, no. 408, 1991, pp. 1245 - 1253.
No. 70 4 Zou, The target-incentive system vs. the price-inoentirve system under adverse
selection and the ratchet effect,loumal ojPubGc Econornits, vol. 46, no. 1, 1991,
PP- 51 - 89.
No.71 E. Bomhoff, Between price reform and privati7ation: Eastern Europe in
transition, Finnnzmarld und PorrfoGo Managemenr, vol. 5, no. 3, 1991, pp. 241 -
2s 1.
No. 72 E. Bomhoff, Stability of velocity in the major industrial oountries: a Kalman [dter
approach, Inremational Monetary Fund SmJf Papers, vol. 38, no. 3, 1991, pp. 626
- 642.
No. 73 E. Bomhoff, Currency convert~bility: when and how? A contnáttion to the
Bulgarian debate, Kredit und Kapitul, vol. 24, no. 3, 1991, pp. 412 - 431.
No.74 H. Keuzenkamp and F. van der Ploeg, Perceived constraints for Dutch
unemployment potity, in C. de Neubourg (ed.), Th~ Art oj Full F,~nployrnent -
Unemployrnenr Policy rn Open Economits, trontributions to Eeonomie Arulysis
203, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1991, pp. 7
- 37.
No. 75 H. Peters and E. van Damme, Charaderizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining
solutions by disagreement point axions, Mathenwtics ojOperotionr Resuweh, vol.
16, no. 3, 1991, pp. 447 - 461.
No. 76 PJ. Deschamps, On the estimated variattces of regression ooefficients in
misspecified error components modeLs, Econorrtetric 77reory, vol. 7, no. 3, 1991,
pp. 369 - 384.
No. 77 A. de Zeeuw, Note on 'Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a differential game
model of capitalism', Jouina! oj Econornic Dynnmics and Control, vol. Ití, no. 1,
1992, pp. 139 - 145.
No. 78 J.R. Magnus, On the tundamental bordered matrix o[ linear estimation, in F. van
der Plceg (ed.), Advanced Ltctruies in Quan[itatiMC Econonrics. London-Orlando:
Academic Press Ltd., 1990, pp. 583 - 604.
No. 79 F. van der Pkxg and A. de Zeeuw, A differential game o[ international pollution
control, Syseemr and Condol Letrers, vol. 17, no. 6, 1991, pp. 409 - 414.
No. 80 Th. Nijman and M. Verbeek, 71te optimal choice ot controls and pre-experimen-
ta1 observations, Joumal of Economerrics. vol. 51, no. 1~2, 1942, pp. 183 - 189.
No. 81 M. Verbeek and Th. Nijman, Can oolwrt data be treated as ~enuine paneJ datat,
Einpiricd Ecavrornws, voL 17, no. 1, 1992, pp. 9- 23.
No. 82 E. van Damme and W. G~ch, EquiLbrium se{edion w the Sperwe sigtwlinB game,
in R Selten (od.), Can~e FquiGbiunr Mode4 !I - Alerhod; Morol; aidMarkets,
Berfio: Sprin~er-Verla~, 1991, pp. 263 - 288.
No. 83 R.P. Gilles and P.H.M. Ruys. Charaderi~atioa ot economic agents in arbitrary
oommunication structures, Niww A~rJ~ief voor Wuiloudr, voL 8, tto. 3, 1990, pp.
323 - 345.
No. 84 A. de Zeeuw snd F. van der Ploeg Difíerenoe 8ames and poliry evalwtion: a
oonoeptual frameworl~ Orford E.cortornic Popas, vol 43, no. 4, 1991, pp. 612 -
636.
No. 85 E. van Damme, Fair division under asymmetric infonmation, in R Selten (ed).
Ratiawl Iruunuion - fssaXr in Ho~rw~r of lohn C Harwnyi, Berlin~Heidelber~
SprinYu-Verlag 1992, pp. 121 - 144.
No. 86 F. de Jong A. Kemna and T. Kloek, A conubution to event study methodolo~
with an application to the Dutch uodc marlcet, Jounw! ojBankinp and Finance,
vol 16, no. i, 1992, pp. 11 - 3á
No. 87 A.P. Barten, ~he estimation of mized demand systems, in R Bewley and T. Van
Hoa (eds.). Coruribuáo~u to Cavuumcr DemanQ ond Bcononudicx EswJa in
Honow ojHaui Thcil, Basinystoke: The Macmillan Pras Ltd., 1942, pp. 31- 57.
No. 88 T. Wansbeek and A Kapteyn, Simpk estimators [or dynamic panel data modeh
with errors in variables, in R Bewlry and T. Van Hoa (eds.), Cauributions ro
Cauiunsr Uemnnd and F.canamebic; Esw~r in Honow of Htnri 77ui1,
BasinQstoke: -Il~e Maanillan Press L.td., 1992, pp. 238 - 251.
No. 89 S. Chib, J. OsiewaLski and M. Sted, Postuior inference on the degrees of
freedom parameter in multivariatet re8tession model~, Economicr Letters, vol
37, ao. 4, 1991, pp. 391 - 397.
No. 90 H. Peters and P. Wakker, Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed
group preferences, Econon~eaico, voL 59, no. 6, 1991, pp. 1787 - 1801.
No. 91 G. Alogoakoufis and F. van der Ploeg, On budgetary policies, ~owth, and
external deficiu in an interdependent world, Jownal oj Nu Japwuse and
Intanationa!Economiu, voL S, no. 4, 1991, pp. 305 - 324.
P.O Rnx AM~.~ Snnn ~ F T~~ R~ ~RC~ TNF NFTHFRI.ANDS
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabanta iNi u u uu ~~~ u i u u iu iiii ~iW U i ~ u ~ iu MU iu
